Combining inquiry and metacognition helps strengthen mathematical learning. This study examines how metacognitive mathematical inquiry can be modeled using reflective tasking approach. Quasi-experimental design was employed in two comparable groups of Grade 9 students of Ibarra National High School, Maasin City, Philippines during the academic year 2021-2022. Lesson guides on reflective task assessments anchored on metacognitive and inquiry-based learning theories, inquiry rubric scales and modified state metacognitive inventory served as data collection instruments. Results of t-test analysis revealed significant difference in (...) performance between groups implying high efficacy of the methodology in stimulating students’ metacognitive inquiry skill. Correlation values projected significant relationship between reflective learning performances with metacognition. Quantitative evidences, thus, lead to conclusion that reflective tasking methodology exemplifies potential in metacognitive mathematical inquiry as it optimizes their thinking processes, task involvement, and regulation through self-reflection principles worthy of practice throughout lifelong learning. (shrink)

This study examines the relationship between technological profile, digital literacy, and self-efficacy among teachers in blended learning. The study utilized the descriptive-correlational design. The participants involved 35 teachers selected via purposive sampling from urban schools in Maasin City implementing printed and online teaching modalities. Standardized tools assessed teachers’ digital technology profile, literacy, and self-efficacy. Significant findings revealed that teachers have easy access to digital technology, are somewhat familiar with technological concepts, often utilize ICT-based technologies, and perceive usage purposes as necessary. (...) Teachers’ digital literacy and self-efficacy are at the average level. Correlation analysis established a significant and strong relationship between the technological profile of teachers and their digital literacy. Digital literacy also significantly and strongly correlated with self-efficacy. This study concluded that the technological profile of teachers influences their digital literacy level. Teachers with high digital literacy skills increase their self-efficacy in technology integration. The blended learning approach constitutes teachers’ digital literacy and self-efficacy as critical players of effectiveness. (shrink)

Morality is often thought of as non-rational or sub-rational. In Moral Notions, first published in 1967, Julius Kovesi argues that the rationality of morality is built into the way we construct moral concepts. In showing this he also resolves the old Humean conundrum of the relation between 'facts' and 'values'. And he puts forward a method of reasoning that might make 'applied ethics' (at present largely a hodge-podge of opinions) into a constructive discipline. Kovesi's general theory of concepts - (...) important in its own right - is indebted to his interpretation of Plato, and his three papers on Plato, first published here, explain this debt. This new edition of Moral Notions also includes a foreward by Philippa Foot, a biography of the author, and a substantial afterword in which the editors, Robert Ewin and Alan Tapper, explain the signficance of Kovesi's work. (shrink)

Julius Kovesi was a moral philosopher contemporary with Alasdair MacIntyre, and dealing with many of the same questions as MacIntyre. In our view, Kovesi’s moral philosophy is rich in ideas and worth revisiting. MacIntyre agrees: Kovesi’s Moral Notions, he has said, is ‘a minor classic in moral philosophy that has not yet received its due’. Kovesi was not a thinker whose work fits readily into any one tradition. Unlike the later MacIntyre, he was not a Thomistic Aristotelian, nor even (...) an Aristotelian. He saw his viewpoint as Platonic, or perhaps more accurately as Socratic. His writings, unlike MacIntyre’s, have little to say about justice. However, Kovesi did offfer a theory of practical reason. His main contention was that all human social life embodies a set of concepts that govern and guide that life, concepts without which that life would be impossible. These include our moral concepts. For Kovesi, moral concepts are not external to, but constitutive of social life in any of its possible forms. But in the course of his argument he also developed a way of thinking about how concepts work, which we term ‘conceptual functionalism’, and which we will elucidate. (shrink)

Conspiracies are, by definition, a group activity; to conspire requires two or more people working together towards some end, typically in secret. Conspirators have intentions; this is borne out by the fact they want some end and are willing to engage in action to achieve. Of course, what these intentions are can be hard to fathom: historians have written a lot about the intentions of the assassins of Julius Caesar, for example; did they want to restore the Republic; was (...) Marcus Brutus lusting after power; was it an attempt to curb the ambitions of the plebeian class, who saw in Caesar someone not unlike themselves? If intentions can be hard to infer, who is a knowing conspirator and who is a dupe is almost as tricky to parse. Not all purported members of a conspiracy are conspirators, even if they aid and abet the conspiracy. Take, for example, the notorious lax engineer who the conspirators know will sign off on substandard building compliance measures, making it all the easier for them to plant their controlled demolitions. On some account of causal or even moral responsibility the lax engineer would then be responsible for the subsequent event, the one the conspirators desired. Yet it also seems clear that even if she is responsible in some sense for the culminating event of the conspiracy, it is clear that they did not conspire. Or, at least, we would like to think so, although should the authorities find out about the lax engineer’s involvement, they may well be considered part of the conspiracy, especially if the conspirators do their best to hide their own involvement or identities. (shrink)

En un escrito de juventud de Peirce publicado en 1868 para el Journal of Speculative Philosophy, titulado “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimen for Man”, el autor norteamericano intenta mostrar por qué carecemos de la capacidad para reconocer cogniciones inmediatas y por qué, a falta de tal facultad, no es posible sostener la existencia de ese tipo de cogniciones; de ahí se desprende su postura anticartesiana y antifundacionista: si no hay cogniciones inmediatas, entonces todas las cogniciones están determinadas por cogniciones previas (...) y, en consecuencia, no hay cogniciones infalibles. Esta concepción del joven Peirce según la cual toda cognición está lógica o inferencialmente determinada por una cognición previa implicaría, entonces, que toda cognición, a su vez, determinaría lógicamente a una cognición posterior. Al seguir esta tesis obtenemos, en consecuencia, una doble determinación, a saber, la de una cognición(n) siendo determinada por otra cognición(n-1) anterior, y la de esa misma cognición(n) determinando a una cognición(n+1) posterior. La tesis de la doble determinación daría lugar, por tanto, no solo a una regresión infinita de determinaciones, sino también a una progresión infinita de determinaciones. [...] Aún hoy sigue abierta la discusión acerca de si en su madurez intelectual y en los albores de su vejez Peirce continuó sosteniendo sus tesis anticartesiana y antifundacionista, de sus escritos de juventud, en relación con la determinablidad de las cogniciones previas, y si aún, en sus escritos de madurez, renunció a la tesis de la progresión infinita de determinaciones. Pero no es mi interés aquí tomar partido en esta discusión. En este escrito me concentraré solamente en dos problemas: a saber, la indeterminabilidad del significado y la explicación del error, y mostraré cómo podría ser posible enfrentarlos adoptando algunos conceptos del pragmaticismo. (shrink)

According to the standard view, a belief is based on a reason and doxastically justified—i.e., permissibly held—only if a causal relation obtains between a reason and the belief. In this paper, I argue that a belief can be doxastically justified by a reason’s mere disposition to sustain it. Such a disposition, however, wouldn’t establish a causal connection unless it were manifested. My argument is that, in the cases I have in mind, the manifestation of this disposition would add no positive (...) epistemic feature to the belief: a belief that is justified after the manifestation of a reason’s causal powers must have already been justified before their manifestation. As a result, those who adhere to the standard causal view of the basing relation face a hard choice: they should either abandon the enormously popular view that doxastic justification has a basing requirement or modify their view of the basing relation. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the relationship between trust and inquiry to argue for the view that A trusts B to act in some way only if A believes, in a way that she cannot distinguish from knowledge, for reasons of trust, that B will (or has) act(ed) in this way. Call such beliefs ‘outright trusting beliefs’. To support this view, I shall argue, by way of various examples, that the conditions under which inquiry erodes trust are the same as the conditions (...) under which inquiry erodes outright trusting belief. This congruence is easily explained abductively if we take trust to involve such a belief constitutively. While philosophers have sometimes thought that the relationship between trust and inquiry threatens or complicates the doxastic account of trust, the argument presented here suggests, surprisingly, that this relationship supports and even strengthens this account. (shrink)

In this paper I shall first illustrate the variety of uses the concept of "nature" can and does have. Then I shall indicate that the confusing variety is not without rhyme or reason. I shall end by saying a few words about the notion of "progress". This may sound surprising but the notion of "progress" does tie up with what I shall try to say about the contrast between nature and convention.

In the diverse but related essays collected in Values and Evaluations, Julius Kovesi's central concerns are the nature of ideological thinking and the rational core of morality. «It is characteristic of ideological beliefs that their truth is upheld independent of the arguments for them,» he contends. He examines ideological tendencies in the Marxist tradition, in attempts to demythologize Christianity, and in modern British ethical theory. In ethics, he continues the attack on the fact/value dichotomy he began in Moral Notions, (...) a dichotomy he thinks has ideological sources. In theology, he argues that demythologizing is really a form of «remythologizing.» A long study of Moses Hess's essay On the Essence of Money is used to illuminate the early thought of Marx. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that joint action permits a certain degree of luck. The cases I have in mind exhibit the following structure: each participant believes that the intended ends of each robustly support the joint action. This belief turns out to be false. Due to lucky circumstances, the discordance in intention never becomes common knowledge. However, common knowledge of the relevant intentions would have undermined the joint action altogether. The analysis of such cases shows the extent to which (...) common knowledge of the participants’ intentions can be harmful to joint action. This extends a recent line of research that has questioned the necessity of common knowledge in joint action. (shrink)

En la primera parte realizo una reconstrucción de la postura infinitista de Peirce a partir de los argumentos formulados en sus textos de juventud. En la segunda parte formulo rápidamente el problema del regreso epistémico de la justificación y reconstruyo tres objeciones clásicas: la objeción de las mentes finitas, la objeción del origen inexplicado, y la objeción de la descripción errada. En la tercera parte muestro cómo en sus textos de juventud Peirce consideró todas estas objeciones y cómo trató de (...) enfrentarlas. En la cuarta parte me adentraré en el periodo de madurez de Peirce para mostrar cómo, con los conceptos de duda y creencia, es posible formular una respuesta más robusta a las objeciones. Finalmente, en la última parte, iré un poco más allá de Peirce, pero sin abandonar el espíritu peircea- no, para mostrar cómo es posible explicar el carácter finito de nuestro ejercicio habitual de dar razones, sin que esto vaya en contravía de la postura infinitista doxástica peirceana sobre la estructura de la justificación. -/- . (shrink)

Spanish Abstract: A partir de un análisis desde la historia del derecho, este artículo de investigación busca demostrar la existencia de un significado de justicia social en el discurso jurídico transnacional actual que se resume en la garantía de estos tres elementos: Estado Social de Derecho, dignidad humana e igualdad de oportunidades. Con esto, se pretende superar el simple estudio de teorías de filósofos de moda como John Rawls a la hora de abordar el problema de cómo entender y materializar (...) la justicia social, particularmente, en el plano constitucional. Finalmente, con la ayuda de algunos breves estudios de caso, se espera proveer un marco mínimo útil para entender cómo la justicia social puede lograrse a través del derecho. -/- English Abstract: Based on an analysis from legal history, this paper seeks to prove the existence of a meaning of social justice in the current transnational legal discourse that can be synthetized in the warranty of these three elements: Social Rule of Law, human dignity, and equal opportunities. Thus, it aims to overcome the mere study of theories of justice drawn up by trendy philosophers like John Ralws when addressing the problem on how to understand and achieve social justice, specially, in constitutional law. Finally, with the help of some brief case studies, the author hopes to provide a minimum framework useful to understand how social justice can be realized through law. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a surge in philosophical work on the rationality of grief. Much of this research is premised on the idea that people tend to grieve much less than would be appropriate or, as it is often called, fitting. My goal in this paper is diagnostic, that is, to articulate two never properly distinguished, and indeed often conflated, arguments in favour of the purported discrepancy between experienced and fitting grief: a metaphysical and a psychological argument. According to the (...) former, grief is rationalized entirely by facts about the past. And because the past is unchangeable, grief can be said to remain forever fitting. According to the latter argument, humans’ emotional resilience causes grief to diminish at a faster rate than would be fitting. Which of these problems we end up facing depends on relatively subtle variations in the characterization of the losses that render grief appropriate. (shrink)

English Abstract: Through the presentation of the history of social justice in global constitutional discourse, this article aims to demonstrate that, although in Colombia there is not a constitutionalized purpose or principle of social justice, as in other countries, the modern notion of distributive justice, also called social justice today, is implicit in the Constitution of 1991 because it enshrined as mandatory rules the three main elements of its meaning at the time of its promulgation: the principle of social rule (...) of law, the principle of human dignity and the right to a material equality. Thus, in Colombia social justice must not be understood in the Aristotelian sense of distributive justice but in accordance with these three elements, and can only be achieved if they are fulfilled. -/- Spanish Abstract: Mediante la presentación de la historia de la justicia social en el discurso constitucional global, este artículo pretende demostrar que, a pesar de no existir en Colombia, como en otros países, un valor o principio constitucional de justicia social, la noción moderna de justicia distributiva, también llamada hoy justicia social, se encuentra implícita en la Constitución de 1991 porque esta consagró como normas obligatorias los tres elementos principales de su significado en el tiempo en el que fue promulgada: el principio de Estado Social de Derecho, el principio de dignidad humana y el derecho a una igualdad material. Así pues, la justicia social debe entenderse en Colombia a partir de esos tres elementos, no según el sentido aristotélico de justicia distributiva, y sólo puede ser alcanzada si ellos se cumplen. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have advocated for an ‘interactive turn’ in the methodology of social-cognition research: to become more ecologically valid, we must design experiments that are interactive, rather than merely observational. While the practical aim of improving ecological validity in the study of social cognition is laudable, we think that the notion of ‘interaction’ is not suitable for this task: as it is currently deployed in the social cognition literature, this notion leads to (...) serious conceptual and methodological confusion. In this paper, we tackle this confusion on three fronts: 1) we revise the ‘interactionist’ definition of interaction; 2) we demonstrate a number of potential methodological confounds that arise in interactive experimental designs; and 3) we show that ersatz interactivity works just as well as the real thing. We conclude that the notion of ‘interaction’, as it is currently being deployed in this literature, obscures an accurate understanding of human social cognition. (shrink)

There is no large number of very small bads that is worse than a small number of very large bads – or so, some maintain, it seems plausible to say. In this article, I criticize and reject two recently proposed vindications of the above intuition put forth by Dale Dorsey and Alex Voorhoeve. Dorsey advocates for a threshold marked by the interference with a person's global life projects: any bad that interferes with the satisfaction of a life project is worse (...) than any number of bads that don't interfere with such a life project. Such thresholds, I argue, are broadly implausible. Voorhoeve gives a contractualist account for the irrelevance of minor bads. His account, I argue, does not, among other things, provide the right kind of reason in defence of the above intuition. (shrink)

R&D collaborations between industry, government, civil society, and research (also known as ‘quadruple helix collaborations’ (QHCs)) have recently gained attention from R&D theorists and practitioners. In aiming to come to grips with their complexity, past models have generally taken a stakeholder-analytical approach based on stakeholder types. Yet stakeholder types are difficult to operationalise. We therefore argue that a processual model is more suited for studying the interaction in QHCs because it eschews matters of titles and identities. We develop such a (...) model in which the QHC is represented as a process of generating four types of value: research value, market value, political value, and societal value. We then apply this processual model in analysing reallife cases of friction in QHCs. Friction is seen, not as an interpersonal clash, but as a discrepancy between two or more value-creation processes that compete for limited resources (some overperforming while others under-performing). (shrink)

One of the questions that any future history of British moral philosophy in the twentieth century should investigate and document is how it came about that Moore's Principia Ethica was appropriated by what we can call the Humean tradition of moral philosophy. I shall not trace that development now but only argue that there was no excuse or justification for it.

However much the preoccupations and problems of moral philosophy have changed in the last decade or so, we retain, with a ritual observance, a basic conceptual framework. Apart from a few bold spirits who disregard the ritual, most moral philosophers, before they can say anything, have to re-enact the moves of trying to justify how they dare to move from description to evaluation, while others, opposing them, claim that they have disregarded sacred texts and violated the most sacred of ritual (...) moves. Some, and I would like to count myself among these, would like to argue that the whole ritual is unnecessary, misleading, confused and confusing and even detrimental to moral philosophy. (shrink)

Enactivists often defend the following two claims: Successful interactions are not driven and explained by the interactors’ ability to mindread. And the mechanisms enabling 2nd personal social cognition and those enabling 3rd personal social cognition are distinct. In this paper, I argue that both of these claims are false. With regard to I argue that enactivists fail to provide a plausible alternative to traditional accounts of social cognition in interaction. I examine and reject Hanne De Jaegher’s view according to which (...) interaction is “constitutive” for social interaction. Furthermore, I critically discuss Shaun Gallagher’s and Daniel Hutto’s views according to which social interactions are exclusively driven by low level cognitive mechanisms such as “gaze following” and “emotion detection”. Concerning, I rely on data from so called “spontaneous response” false belief tasks to show that interactive and observational paradigms require the same “social-cognitive” interpretation. (shrink)

Compares and contrasts Open Theism with Theological Determinism, Molinism, and Process Theism.

Philosophers often identify forgiveness with either overcoming or forswearing blaming attitudes such as, paradigmatically, resentment for the right reasons; yet there is little debate as to which of the two (if either) is correct. In this article, I present three arguments that aim to strengthen the forswearing view. First, on the overcoming view, many paradigm cases of forgiveness would turn out to be mere ‘letting go’ instead. Second, only the forswearing view plausibly allows for forgiveness in cases where the victim (...) lost resentment before she had a reason to forgive. Third, only the forswearing view can show why victims of an offense are usually able to know whether they are in a position to forgive. (shrink)

This essay investigates triadic patterns of argument in the thought of Moses Hess. Three kinds of triadic thinking are distinguished: the triadic pattern of three succeeding ages of mankind; the triadic pattern of original unity, fallen or alienated existence, and return to unity on a higher level; and the triad of head, heart and stomach, a symbolism which recurs in the writings of the Young Hegelians. Distinguishing these patterns throws an interesting light on the similarities and differences between the views (...) of Hess and Marx on the role of the proletariat in history. A translation by the author of Hess's "On the Essence of Money" is appended to the essay. (shrink)

It is obvious that the fact that I consider my views to be true does not mean that they are true. However, not only is it my obligation to say what I think to be the case, but I do not know what else I should or even could say. It may be suggested – pointlessly – that I should say what is objectively true and not what I subjectively think to be true. The suggestion is pointless because if I (...) thought my views to be true merely subjectively, I would not entertain them; it is precisely because I think that they are objectively true that I do in fact hold them. It may also be suggested, equally unhelpfully, that if there existed a system of philosophy which contained the truth and nothing but the truth, then we should teach that system and not the views that we personally consider to be true. Since some people think that such a system does indeed exist, let us consider why this suggestion does not enable us to say something other than what each of us considers to be true. (shrink)

What I have to say has no exclusive reference to biblical scholars or theologians. Even most of the mistakes and fallacies I want to point to and investigate are shared by others who also operate in a theological frame of mind. Otherwise the problems I want to raise are familiar problems of philosophy. They are problems we encounter in the philosophy of history when we distinguish between the actual occurrence and documentation of a happening, and the significance, meaning and interpretation (...) of that happening. (shrink)

The study investigated assessment of sex and age impersonation as academic dishonest behaviour among post graduate students’ of Federal Universities of South-South, Nigeria. The study which is a survey research, involved a multi-stage stratified random sampling technique of 440 males and 490 females from 3 universities and 3 faculties of the same universities in South-South, Nigeria. Sample was selected through stratified random sampling approach. The study adopted frequencies, percentages, factor analysis and multiple classification analysis statistical tools. A questionnaire developed and (...) validated by the researcher titled: “Academic Dishonest Behaviour Questionnaire’’ (ADBQ) with Cronbach coefficient alpha reliability of 0.83 was used for data collection. Two research questions and one hypothesis were formulated for the study. The findings indicated that the students used for this study were involved in Sex and Age impersonation aspect of academic dishonest behaviours. Female students were seen to be more involved than male in impersonation, Students ages 25-29years are more culpable in impersonation as academic dishonest behaviour. It is therefore recommended among others that there should be synergy among stakeholders in the educational process to fight this art of impersonation. (shrink)

In discussing the ways in which we hold each other accountable for immoral conduct, philosophers have often focused on blame, aiming to specify adequate responses to wrongdoing. In contrast, theorizing about the ways we can appropriately respond to minor moral mistakes – i.e., criticizable conduct that is bad but not wrong – has largely been neglected. My first goal in this paper is, thus, to draw attention to this blind spot and argue that a separate account of blameless moral criticism (...) is desirable. My second goal is to propose one way to explicate the contrast between blaming and blameless moral criticism in terms of the contrast between moral anger and moral disappointment: while moral anger, as many argue, is an appropriate response to moral wrongdoing, moral disappointment, but not moral anger, is an appropriate response to these minor moral mistakes. (shrink)

Salience reasoning, many have argued, can help solve coordination problems, but only if such reasoning is supplemented by higher-order predictions, e.g. beliefs about what others believe yet others will choose. In this paper, I will argue that this line of reasoning is self-undermining. Higher-order behavioral predictions defeat salience-based behavioral predictions. To anchor my argument in the philosophical literature, I will develop it in response and opposition to the popular Lewisian model of salience reasoning in coordination games. This model imports the (...) problematic higher-order beliefs by way of a ‘symmetric reasoning’ constraint. In the second part of this paper, I will argue that a player may employ salience reasoning only if she suspends judgment about what others believe yet others will do. (shrink)

Police officers' work-life conflict is linked to more subjective health complaints, suicidal thoughts, burnout, and stress in addition to higher degrees of job discontent. Further research findings highlight the significant relationship between stress and work-life balance or work-family conflict affecting police officers regardless of their gender, despite the fact that significant gender differences regarding psychosocial stress were found in general, but especially among police officers who were married and/or had children. Similarly, despite conflicting findings, several research show that gender neither (...) predicts nor significantly differs between male and female police officers in terms of job satisfaction. This study was focused on determining the factors influencing the perception of job satisfaction among police officers which will be used as a basis for improved personnel management in terms of environment and atmosphere, compensation, standards and policies, people, leadership, and organization. This study was participated by one hundred sixty police officers (160). This study was focused on determining the factors influencing the perception of job satisfaction among police officers which will be used as a basis for improved personnel management in terms of environment and atmosphere, compensation, standards and policies, people, leadership, and organization. This study used a purposive sampling technique in choosing the respondents of this study. The descriptive design is an appropriate method to facilitate the gathering of reliable and accurate data through research and conduct of the survey measurement of two or more variables to determine or estimate the extent to which the values for the variables are related or change in an identifiable pattern. (shrink)

According to statistics, there is an increasing gun-related deaths, violence and trafficking of small arms are emergent consequents of failure towards gun regulation and irresponsible gun ownership worldwide. Thus, this study was conducted to examine the implementation of the Gun Control Policy in Caraga Region focusing on the aspect of enforcement and monitoring. Also, the study aimed to investigate the problems encountered in the implementation of the gun control policy in enforcement and monitoring with the gun owners/operators and PNP personnel (...) as respondents. This study was conducted using the descriptive correlational research design. The study revealed the following findings: Majority of the Gun Operator/Owner respondents are college level, employed to private institutions who owned 1 to 2 guns, license for 1-5 years, mostly under type-1 category. For the PNP Personnel respondents, most of them are purely Baccalaureate holders who served the organization for 6-10 years and have 5 to 10 years’ experience as licensing officers. In terms of the enforcement and monitoring of the gun control policies, the respondents basically rated it as Highly Implemented. On the test of significance, there was a significant difference on the assessment of the respondents in gun control policy monitoring but showed to have no significant difference on the respondent’s assessment in enforcement. Both Gun owners and PNP respondents considered the problems encountered in enforcement and monitoring as highly prevalent problems. On the test of significance, there was no significant difference in the assessment of the respondents for both enforcement and monitoring of Gun Control policies. On the test of significant relationship, there was a significant relationship on the Gun control policies enforcement and monitoring with its problems encountered. It can be concluded that the Gun Control policies were fairly implemented by the government despite the challenges like the problems encountered in its enforcement and monitoring. The problems encountered in enforcement and monitoring were highly prevalent thus it needs serious actions by the PNP organization. It can further be concluded that there is a correlation between the Gun control policies and its problems encountered. Thus, the PNP must conduct series of orientation and forum among the gun owners / operators to strengthen the implementation of the gun control policies, must adopt technology in a form of online app design to hasten the documentation and tracing of expired gun licenses, create more information campaign to prevent gun violence in the future maximizing various platforms, must create “hotline” call center as support mechanism in monitoring unregistered and lost firearms and create online gun licensing system. (shrink)

A longish (12 page) discussion of Richard Sorabji's excellent book, with a further discussion of what it means for a theory of emotions to be a cognitive theory.

This reply to an ongoing debate between conspiracy theory researchers from different disciplines exposes the conceptual confusions that underlie some of the disagreements in conspiracy theory research. Reconciling these conceptual confusions is important because conspiracy theories are a multidisciplinary topic and a profound understanding of them requires integrative insights from different fields. Specifically, we distinguish research focussing on conspiracy *theories* (and theorizing) from research of conspiracy *belief* (and mindset, theorists) and explain how particularism with regards to conspiracy theories does not (...) mean we cannot define a problematic subclass of conspiracy beliefs, while avoiding the problems of generalism. We hope this reply helps conspiracy theory researchers recognize the differences between studying conspiracy theories and conspiracy beliefs and appreciate the possibilities for fruitful, integrative, and interdisciplinary research. (shrink)

Computational Functionalism is a subfield of philosophy of mind most relevant to the subject of cognitive science as well as to artificial intelligence (AI). The analysis of this paper focuses on Hilary Putnam’s and Gualtiero Piccinini’s standpoints regarding the molecular understanding of computation. Finally, Putnam’s argument of the functionalism in notion of the mental states is based on the positive definition of those states by their functions, while Piccinini, and on the other hand suggest that an understanding of the mechanism (...) of computation will go a long way to explaining cognition. This research also points out shortcomings of functionalism in their theories especially in regards to connectivity with physicality of AI structures. Therefore, the paper identifies the following gaps: The first gap holds that although both theorists have important insights, the two approaches put forward by the respective theorists are flawed and a better proposal is required, then a new proposal is suggested In identifying these gaps, the paper seeks to contribute to the literature by arguing for the need to develop a composite of the two theorists. The results show that the big ideas are important in present-day AI debate and analysis, which helps to explain the mind as computation. (shrink)

l. There is an antinomy in Hare's thought between Ought-Implies-Can and No-Indicatives-from-Imperatives. It cannot be resolved by drawing a distinction between implication and entailment. 2. Luther resolved this antinomy in the l6th century, but to understand his solution, we need to understand his problem. He thought the necessity of Divine foreknowledge removed contingency from human acts, thus making it impossible for sinners to do otherwise than sin. 3. Erasmus objected (on behalf of Free Will) that this violates Ought-Implies-Can which he (...) supported with Hare-style ordinary language arguments. 4. Luther a) pointed out the antinomy and b) resolved it by undermining the prescriptivist arguments for Ought-Implies-Can. 5. We can reinforce Luther's argument with an example due to David Lewis. 6. Whatever its merits as a moral principle, Ought-Implies-Can is not a logical truth and should not be included in deontic logics. Most deontic logics, and maybe the discipline itself, should therefore be abandoned. 7. Could it be that Ought-Conversationally-Implies-Can? Yes - in some contexts. But a) even if these contexts are central to the evolution of Ought, the implication is not built into the semantics of the word; b) nor is the parallel implication built into the semantics of orders; and c) in some cases Ought conversationally implies Can, only because Ought-Implies-Can is a background moral belief. d) Points a) and b) suggest a criticism of prescriptivism - that Oughts do not entail imperatives but that the relation is one of conversational implicature. 8. If Ought-Implies-Can is treated as a moral principle, Erasmus' argument for Free Will can be revived (given his Christian assumptions). But it does not 'prove' Pelagianism as Luther supposed. A semi-Pelagian alternative is available. (shrink)

This essay explores the psychological freedom that emerges from the acceptance of death, arguing that it should not be seen as merely a one-sided freedom of death without the complementary freedom of life. While death is often met with dread and fear, it can foster a sense of authenticity and alignment with personal values. However, this realization must also emphasize the importance of life, as the goal of psychological well-being lies in living, not just acknowledging death. This balance allows us (...) to live fully, prioritize meaningful experiences, and discard trivial concerns. By drawing on Carl Sagan’s reflections on humanity’s insignificance within the cosmos, this essay encourages empowered and responsible living that embraces both life and death. (shrink)

The thesis of this article is that there has never been any ground for the controversy between the doctrine of free will and determinism, that it is based upon a misapprehension, that the two assertions are entirely consistent, that one of them strictly implies the other, that they have been opposed only because of our natural want of the analytical imagination. In so saying I do not tamper with the meaning of either phrase. That would be unpardonable. I mean free (...) will in the natural and usual sense, in the fullest, the most absolute sense in which for the purposes of the personal and moral life the term is ever employed. I mean it as implying responsibility, merit and demerit, guilt and desert. I mean it as implying, after an act has been performed, that one " could have done otherwise " than one did. I mean it as conveying these things also, not in any subtly modified sense but in exactly the sense in which we conceive them in life and in law and in ethics. These two doctrines have been opposed because we have not realised that free will can be analysed without being destroyed, and that determinism is merely a feature of the analysis of it. And if we are tempted to take refuge in the thought of an "ultimate ", an "innermost" liberty that eludes the analysis, then we have implied a deterministic basis and constitution for this liberty as well. For such a basis and constitution lie in the idea of liberty. -/- The thesis is not, like that of Green or Bradley, that the contending opinions are reconciled if we adopt a certain metaphysic of the ego, as that it is timeless, and identifies itself with a desire by a " timeless act". This is to say that the two are irreconcilable, as they are popularly supposed to be, except by a theory that delivers us from the conflict by taking us out of time. Our view on the contrary is that from the natural and temporal point of view itself there never was any need of a reconciliation but only of a comprehension of the meaning of terms. (The metaphysical nature of the self and its identity through time is a problem for all who confront memory, anticipation, etc.; it has no peculiar difficulties arising from the present problem.) -/- I am not maintaining that determinism is true; only that it is true insofar as we have free will. That we are free in willing is, broadly speaking, a fact of experience. That broad fact is more assured than any philosophical analysis. It is therefore surer than the deterministic analysis of it, entirely adequate as that in the end appears to be. But it is not here affirmed that there are no small exceptions, no slight undetermined swervings, no ingredient of absolute chance. All that is here said is that such absence of determination, if and so far as it exists, is no gain to freedom, but sheer loss of it; no advantage to the moral life, but blank subtraction from it. -- When I speak below of "the indeterminist" I mean the libertarian indeterminist, that is, him who believes in free will and holds that it involves indetermination. (shrink)

In Galileo's Error, Philip Goff sets out a manifesto for a post-Galilean science of consciousness. Article four of the manifesto reads: 'Anti-Dualism: Consciousness is not separate from the physical world; rather consciousness is located in the intrinsic nature of the physical world.' I argue that there is an important sense of ‘dualism’ in which Goff’s arguments are not only compatible with but entail dualism, and not only dualism but substance dualism. Substance dualism, in the sense I have in mind, is (...) the view that (i) there are two sides to reality, a fundamentally mental side and a fundamentally nonmental side; and (ii) the fundamentally mental side consists of mental substances resembling Cartesian souls. I do not suggest that this is bad news for post-Galilean science of consciousness. My aim is rather to push for a certain view about what a theory of consciousness motivated by Goff’s arguments must look like. (shrink)

Practical reason is the general human capacity for resolving, through reflection, the question of what one is to do. Deliberation of this kind is practical in at least two senses. First, it is practical in its subject matter, insofar as it is concerned with action. But it is also practical in its consequences or its issue, insofar as reflection about action itself directly moves people to act. Our capacity for deliberative self-determination raises two sets of philosophical problems. For one thing, (...) there are questions about how deliberation can succeed in being practical in its issue. What do we need to assume—both about agents and about the processes of reasoning they engage in—to make sense of the fact that deliberative reflection can directly give rise to action? Can we do justice to this dimension of practical reason while preserving the idea that practical deliberation is genuinely a form of reasoning? For another, there are large issues concerning the content of the standards that are brought to bear in practical reasoning. Which norms for the assessment of action are binding on us as deliberating agents? Do these norms provide resources for critical reflection about our ends, or are they exclusively instrumental? Under what conditions do moral norms yield valid standards for reasoning about action? The first set of issues is addressed in sections §§1–3 of the present article, while sections §§4–6 cover the second set of issues. (shrink)

Climate change is today one of the greatest risks to peace and security, but arguably remains at the margins of policy action amid the loss of trust in multilateral institutions. The impacts of climate change are already felt by local communities in regions on the frontline. While communities have exercised agency to generate local impact and promote trust, the overwhelming impact of climate change necessitates effective state responses, and regional and global cooperation. Global cooperation, in turn, needs to better address (...) the challenges to peace and security faced by regions most exposed to the impacts of climate change. Southeast Asia is already experiencing direct climate change impacts from changes in temperature, precipitation, sea-level rise, ocean warming, and more frequent and intense extreme weather events. The subsequent indirect climate change impacts on food and water security, and changes in natural resource exploitation and migration patterns, affect the lives and livelihoods of people and communities across the highly diverse region and threaten its peace and security. In Southeast Asia, the cross-cutting impacts of climate change on peace and security can be analysed through the framework of comprehensive security. Comprehensive security is the organising concept of security in the region, integrated and widely reflected in the security lexicon in the ASEAN region and beyond. Unlike the conventional notion of security, which is narrowly defined to mean defending state borders from military attack, comprehensive security is a much broader conceptualisation of security that “[goes] beyond (but does not exclude) the military threats to embrace the political, economic and socio-cultural dimensions.". (shrink)

Climate change is today one of the greatest risks to peace and security, but arguably remains at the margins of policy action amid the loss of trust in multilateral institutions. The impacts of climate change are already felt by local communities in regions on the frontline. While communities have exercised agency to generate local impact and promote trust, the overwhelming impact of climate change necessitates effective state responses, and regional and global cooperation.2 Global cooperation, in turn, needs to better address (...) the challenges to peace and security faced by regions most exposed to the impacts of climate change. Southeast Asia is already experiencing direct climate change impacts from changes in temperature, precipitation, sea-level rise, ocean warming, and more frequent and intense extreme weather events. The subsequent indirect climate change impacts on food and water security, and changes in natural resource exploitation and migration patterns, affect the lives and livelihoods of people and communities across the highly diverse region and threaten its peace and security. (shrink)

Розкрито сутність поняття «рейтинг». Доведено значущість рейтингової оцінки для суб’єктів фінансового ринку, зокрема для страхових компаній, потенційних страхувальників, інвесторів та кредиторів.

In psychology, stress is a feeling of emotional strain and pressure. Stress is a type of psychological pain. Small amounts of stress may be beneficial, as it can improve athletic performance, motivation and reaction to the environment. Excessive amounts of stress, however, can increase the risk of strokes, heart attacks, ulcers, and mental illnesses such as depression and also aggravation of a pre-existing condition. Psychological stress can be external and related to the environment but may also be caused by internal (...) perceptions that cause an individual to experience anxiety or other negative emotions surrounding a situation, such as pressure, discomfort, etc., which they then deem stressful. (shrink)